Re: RFC: on adding new CLONE_* flags [WAS Re: [PATCH 0/4] clone: add CLONE_PIDFD]
- Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 16:58:52 -0700
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: RFC: on adding new CLONE_* flags [WAS Re: [PATCH 0/4] clone: add CLONE_PIDFD]
On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 2:26 PM Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 9:34 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > I would personally *love* it if distros started setting no_new_privs
> > for basically all processes. And pidfd actually gets us part of the
> > way toward a straightforward way to make sudo and su still work in a
> > no_new_privs world: su could call into a daemon that would spawn the
> > privileged task, and su would get a (read-only!) pidfd back and then
> > wait for the fd and exit. I suppose that, done naively, this might
> > cause some odd effects with respect to tty handling, but I bet it's
> > solveable. I suppose it would be nifty if there were a way for a
> Hmm, isn't what you're describing roughly what systemd-run -t does? It
> will serialize the argument list, ask PID 1 to create a transient unit
> (go through the polkit stuff), and then set the stdout/stderr and
> stdin of the service to your tty, make it the controlling terminal of
> the process and
> reset it. So I guess it should work with sudo/su just fine too.
> There is also s6-sudod (and a s6-sudoc client to it) that works in a
> similar fashion, though it's a lot less fancy.
Cute. Now we just distros to work out the kinks and to ship these as
sudo and su :)
> > process, by mutual agreement, to reparent itself to an unrelated
> > process.
> > Anyway, clone(2) is an enormous mess. Surely the right solution here
> > is to have a whole new process creation API that takes a big,
> > extensible struct as an argument, and supports *at least* the full
> > abilities of posix_spawn() and ideally covers all the use cases for
> > fork() + do stuff + exec(). It would be nifty if this API also had a
> > way to say "add no_new_privs and therefore enable extra functionality
> > that doesn't work without no_new_privs". This functionality would
> > include things like returning a future extra-privileged pidfd that
> > gives ptrace-like access.
> My idea was that this intent could be supplied at clone time, you
> could attach ptrace access modes to a pidfd (we could make those a bit
> granular, perhaps) and any API that takes PIDs and checks against the
> caller's ptrace access mode could instead derive so from the pidfd.
> Since killing is a bit convoluted due to setuid binaries, that should
> work if one is CAP_KILL capable in the owning userns of the task, and
> if not that, has permissions to kill and the target has NNP set.
This CAP_KILL trick makes me nervous. This particular permission is
really quite powerful, and it would need some analysis to conclude
that it's not *more* powerful than CAP_KILL.
> would allow you to bind kill privileges in a way that is compatible
> with both worlds, the upshot being NNP allows for the functionality to
> be available to a lot more of userspace. Ofcourse, this would require
> a new clone version, possibly with taking a clone2 struct which sets a
> few parameters for the process and the flags for the pidfd.
> Another point is that you have a pidfd_open (or something else) that
> can create multiple pidfds from a pidfd obtained at clone time and
> create pidfds with varying level of rights. It can also work by taking
> a TID to open a pidfd for an external task (and then for all the
> rights you wish to acquire on it, check against your ambient
> (Actually, in general, having FMODE_* style bits spanning all methods
> a file descriptor can take (through system calls), with the type of
> object as key (class containing a set), and be able to enable/disable
> them and seal them would be a useful addition, this all happening at
> the struct file level instead of inode level sealing in memfds).
At the risk of saying a dirty word, the Windows API works quite a bit
like this :)