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[PATCH v6 1/9] vsprintf: Shuffle restricted_pointer()




This is just a preparation step for further changes.

The patch does not change the code.

Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 lib/vsprintf.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 3add92329bae..e164d7b734f3 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -716,6 +716,55 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
 	return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
 }
 
+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+
+static noinline_for_stack
+char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+			 struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+	switch (kptr_restrict) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Always print %pK values */
+		break;
+	case 1: {
+		const struct cred *cred;
+
+		/*
+		 * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+		 * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+		 */
+		if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
+			if (spec.field_width == -1)
+				spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
+			return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+		 * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+		 * same credentials it started with. This is because
+		 * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+		 * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+		 * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+		 * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+		 */
+		cred = current_cred();
+		if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+		    !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+		    !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+			ptr = NULL;
+		break;
+	}
+	case 2:
+	default:
+		/* Always print 0's for %pK */
+		ptr = NULL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
+}
+
 static noinline_for_stack
 char *dentry_name(char *buf, char *end, const struct dentry *d, struct printf_spec spec,
 		  const char *fmt)
@@ -1475,55 +1524,6 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
 	return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
 }
 
-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
-
-static noinline_for_stack
-char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
-			 struct printf_spec spec)
-{
-	switch (kptr_restrict) {
-	case 0:
-		/* Always print %pK values */
-		break;
-	case 1: {
-		const struct cred *cred;
-
-		/*
-		 * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
-		 * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
-		 */
-		if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
-			if (spec.field_width == -1)
-				spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
-			return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Only print the real pointer value if the current
-		 * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
-		 * same credentials it started with. This is because
-		 * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
-		 * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
-		 * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
-		 * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
-		 */
-		cred = current_cred();
-		if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
-		    !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
-		    !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
-			ptr = NULL;
-		break;
-	}
-	case 2:
-	default:
-		/* Always print 0's for %pK */
-		ptr = NULL;
-		break;
-	}
-
-	return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
-}
-
 static noinline_for_stack
 char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr,
 		  struct printf_spec spec,  const char *fmt)
-- 
2.13.7