Re: [intel-sgx-kernel-dev] [PATCH v5 11/11] intel_sgx: driver documentation
- Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 16:01:05 +1300
- From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [intel-sgx-kernel-dev] [PATCH v5 11/11] intel_sgx: driver documentation
On Mon, 2017-11-13 at 21:45 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Documentation/index.rst | 1 +
> Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst | 131
> 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> diff --git a/Documentation/index.rst b/Documentation/index.rst
> index cb7f1ba5b3b1..ccfebc260e04 100644
> --- a/Documentation/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/index.rst
> @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ implementation.
> :maxdepth: 2
> + x86/index
> Korean translations
> diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..34bcf6a2a495
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_sgx.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
> +Intel(R) SGX driver
> +Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by
> applications to
> +set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the
> enclave is
> +disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access
> +In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It
> protects the
> +application from a malicious host.
> +There is a new hardware unit in the processor called Memory
> Encryption Engine
> +(MEE) starting from the Skylake microarchitecture. BIOS can define
> one or many
> +MEE regions that can hold enclave data by configuring them with
> PRMRR registers.
> +The MEE automatically encrypts the data leaving the processor
> package to the MEE
> +regions. The data is encrypted using a random key whose life-time is
> exactly one
> +power cycle.
Not sure whether you should talk about MEE staff here. They are not in
SDM and (thus) may potentially be changed in the future.
> +You can tell if your CPU supports SGX by looking into
> + ``cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep sgx``
> +Enclave data types
> +SGX defines new data types to maintain information about the
> enclaves and their
> +security properties.
> +The following data structures exist in MEE regions:
> +* **Enclave Page Cache (EPC):** memory pages for protected code and
> +* **Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM):** meta-data for each EPC page
> +The Enclave Page Cache holds following types of pages:
> +* **SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)**: meta-data defining the
> + properties of an enclave such as range of addresses it can access.
> +* **Regular (REG):** containing code and data for the enclave.
> +* **Thread Control Structure (TCS):** defines an entry point for a
> + thread to enter into the enclave. The enclave can only be entered
> + these entry points.
> +* **Version Array (VA)**: an EPC page receives a unique 8 byte
> version number
> + when it is swapped, which is then stored into a VA page. A VA page
> can hold up
> + to 512 version numbers.
> +Launch control
> +For launching an enclave, two structures must be provided for
> +1. **SIGSTRUCT:** a signed measurement of the enclave binary.
> +2. **EINITTOKEN:** the measurement, the public key of the signer and
> + enclave attributes. This structure contains a MAC of its contents
> + hardware derived symmetric key called *launch key*.
> +The hardware platform contains a root key pair for signing the
> +for a *launch enclave* that is able to acquire the *launch key* for
> +creating EINITTOKEN's for other enclaves. For the launch enclave
> +EINITTOKEN is not needed because it is signed with the private root
> +There are two feature control bits associate with launch control
> +* **IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL**: locks down the feature control
> +* **IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL**: allow runtime reconfiguration of
> + IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs that define MRSIGNER hash for the
> + enclave. Essentially they define a signing key that does not
> + EINITTOKEN to be let run.
> +The BIOS can configure IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs before feature
> +register is locked.
> +It could be tempting to implement launch control by writing the MSRs
> +every time when an enclave is launched. This does not scale because
> +generic case because BIOS might lock down the MSRs before handover
> +the OS.
> +Debug enclaves
> +Enclave can be set as a *debug enclave* of which memory can be read
> or written
> +by using the ENCLS(EDBGRD) and ENCLS(EDBGWR) opcodes. The Intel
> provided launch
> +enclave provides them always a valid EINITTOKEN and therefore they
> are a low
> +hanging fruit way to try out SGX.
> +Launch control
> +The values for IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs cannot be emulated for a
> +machine guest. It would easily seem feasible to hold virtual values
> for these
> +MSRs, trap ENCLS(EINIT) and use the host LE to generate a token when
> a guest LE
> +is initialized.
IMHO, this statement doesn't make sense to me because of:
- Guest LE doesn't need a token. Guest LE is nothing different from
Host LE from HW's point of view.
- Host LE won't (and shouldn't) generate token for any enclave from
guest. Guset LE generates token for enclaves in the guest, just like
host LE generates token for enclaves in the host (but not guest).
- In fact, theoretically KVM guest can still run LE and other enclaves
without entire host SGX driver. There's no dependency between host LE
and guest enclaves.
> +However, looking at the pseudo code of ENCLS(EINIT) from the SDM
> there is a
> +constraint that the instruction will fail if
> ATTRIBUTES.EINITTOKENKEY is set
> +(the documentation does not tell the reason why the constraint
> exists but it
Don't understand what you mean. This statement in SDM has nothing to do
with virtualization. It's just description of hehavior of EINIT.
> +Thus, only when the MSRs are left unlocked before handover to the OS
> +setting of these MSRs can be supported for VM guests.
IMHO you can just remove this "virtualization" section entirely as your
first upstreaming driver won't consider virtualization at all.
> +Suspend and resume
> +If the host suspends and resumes, the enclave memory for the VM
> guest could
> +become invalid. This can make ENCLS leaf operations suddenly fail.
> +The driver has a graceful fallback mechanism to manage this
> situation. If any of
> +the ENCLS leaf operations fail, the driver will fallback by kicking
> threads out
> +of the enclave, removing the TCS entries and marking enclave as
> invalid. After
> +this no new pages can be allocated for the enclave and no entry can
> be done.
> +SGX uapi
> +.. kernel-doc:: drivers/platform/x86/intel_sgx_ioctl.c
> + :functions: sgx_ioc_enclave_create
> + sgx_ioc_enclave_add_page
> + sgx_ioc_enclave_init
> +.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
> +* System Programming Manual: 39.1.4 Intel® SGX Launch Control
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