Re: FYI/RFC: early-rng-init-tools
- Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 12:34:25 -0500
- From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: FYI/RFC: early-rng-init-tools
>>>>> "Ben" == Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> The additional entropy gathered is for extra safety; it is not
>> *depended* on for basic security assumptions.
Ben> It is, because the the kernel is told to treat it as providing
Ben> a certain number of bits of entropy.
I see no problem crediting the secret stored across the reboot with the
entropy in the pool at the time of shutdown.
I agree that the credits for the entropy of the additional information
added may be too high.
I'm skeptical that the actual entropy credits matter much once you have
*enough*, but I agree that the /dev/random interface does depend on
that, and the proposal as described may be violating that assumption.