Re: Q: Where is keyring packaging guideline?
- Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 15:41:20 +0200
- From: Wouter Verhelst <wouter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: Q: Where is keyring packaging guideline?
On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 01:15:03PM +0200, Adam Borowski wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 01:39:29PM +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Kentaro Hayashi wrote:
> > > I want to make 3rd party keyring package (ITP). In the advance, I
> > > want to know a best practice about *keyring* packaging. Any hints?
> > > sudo apt install -y -V --allow-unauthenticated foobar-keyring
> > > This is reasonable because there is no correct key yet before
> > > installing it.
> > I don't think this is appropriate at all. Instead, always use an
> > out-of-band mechanism for confirming the appropriate OpenPGP keys.
> > Having the keyring package in Debian itself is a good idea, but at
> > very bare minimum, download the key or fingerprint from a website that
> > uses a valid TLS certificate according to the X.509 CA trust model.
> Uh, what?
> You do realize that the CA cartel model is security theatre, intentionally
> subverted to provide so-called "responsible encryption"? To break it, you
> need to either:
> * control _any_ of thousands of CAs (not merely roots), many of which have
> already been caught issuing MITM certs or are otherwise well-known to be
> conducting massive scale MITM by other means. Some of those were papered
> over as "it was just a honest error, we swear!", some led to removal from
> ca-certificates -- all while multiple other CAs controlled by the same
> government are still there.
> * get hold of a SSL private key. Unlike gpg which can be done offline, SSL
> keys must be available on every front-end server all the time.
> Thus, having a trust anchor provided in the Debian archive would be a
> massive improvement.
Sure. But what Paul mentioned "at very bare minimum". That is, better
options are available, but it's easy to do better than
"--allow-unauthenticated" and that should really not be encouraged.
I agree that having a key fingerprint on a valid TLS website is less
good than having a trust anchor in Debian, but it is much better than to
just install any random key with --allow-unauthenticated, or something
Could you people please use IRC like normal people?!?
-- Amaya Rodrigo Sastre, trying to quiet down the buzz in the DebConf 2008