Re: gpg ca-cert-file=[which file???]
- Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2017 12:38:42 -0400
- From: Lee <ler762@xxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: gpg ca-cert-file=[which file???]
On 7/16/17, René Berber wrote:
> On 7/15/2017 11:56 PM, Lee wrote:
>> I'm guessing the "keyserver-options ca-cert-file=" needs to be
>> pointing at the ca-certificate package root store - but damnifiknow
>> where it is :(
> That lists what is being installed, and where.
> The tls-ca-bundle files contain the root certificates.
Thanks - that gets me a bit further down the rabbit hole.
which the ca-certificates bundle shows as a 0 byte file pointing to
which is also a 0 byte file??
but there's several README files, so let's take a look
Distrust information cannot be represented in this file format,
and distrusted certificates are missing from these files.
oops. distrusted certs are missing, so I probably don't want to use
Please refer to the update-ca-trust(8) manual page for additional information.
ok... man update-ca-trust
Classic filename, file contains a list of CA certificates in
the extended BEGIN/END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE file format,
which includes trust (and/or distrust) flags specific to
certificate usage. This file is a symbolic link that refers
to the consolidated output created by the update-ca-trust command.
cool.. that sounds like what I want
/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.trust.crt is a link to
so let's fix my gpg.conf:
$ grep "^keyserver" ~/.gnupg/gpg.conf
temporarily remove my list of public keys
$ mv ~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg ~/.gnupg/orig-pubring.gpg
start wireshark & give it a try
$ gpg --auto-key-locate keyserver --keyserver-options
auto-key-retrieve --verify BIND9.9.10-P1.x64.zip.asc
gpg: keyring `/home/Lee/.gnupg/pubring.gpg' created
gpg: assuming signed data in `BIND9.9.10-P1.x64.zip'
gpg: Signature made Mon, Jun 5, 2017 2:31:57 PM EDT
gpg: using RSA key 0xF1B11BF05CF02E57
gpg: requesting key 0xF1B11BF05CF02E57 from hkps server pgp.mit.edu
gpg: key 0xF1B11BF05CF02E57: public key "Internet Systems Consortium,
Inc. (Signing key, 2017-2018) <codesign@xxxxxxx>" imported
gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1 (RSA: 1)
gpg: Good signature from "Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. (Signing
key, 2017-2018) <codesign@xxxxxxx>"
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: BE0E 9748 B718 253A 28BB 89FF F1B1 1BF0 5CF0 2E57
yay! I got the public key using TLS
$ cd /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/openssl
$ grep DigiNotar ca-bundle.trust.crt
# Explicitly Distrust DigiNotar Cyber CA
# Explicitly Distrust DigiNotar Cyber CA 2nd
# Explicitly Distrust DigiNotar Root CA
# Explicitly Distrust DigiNotar Services 1024 CA
# Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid
# Explicitly Distrusted DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2
$ grep CNNIC ca-bundle.trust.crt
# CNNIC ROOT
Mozilla currently recommends not trusting any certificates issued by
this CA after 1st April 2015. This covers two roots in our store -
"CNNIC ROOT" and "China Internet Network Information Center EV
back to man update-ca-trust
... and I'm lost :(
It looks like there's some certs in
/etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/openssl/ca-bundle.trust.crt that I don't
want to trust.. but how to tell which ones & how to set
distrust/blacklist trust flags on them? or maybe I need to copy them
to /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blacklist/ ???
Anyone have any pointers on how to distrust certs in
ca-bundle.trust.crt (assuming that _is_ the file I should be using) or
even how to show exactly what's in there?
$ grep "#" ca-bundle.trust.crt
shows lots of comments but
$ openssl x509 -in ca-bundle.trust.crt -noout -subject -dates
just shows me the first cert :(
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